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Abstract  
This paper deals with a still very pressing topic, and lively debate, within Political Science and 
International Relations – the formation of modern states. It delineates the main narratives that seek 
to explain the formation of the modern state in Western Europe, namely: an economic, a 
managerial, and a military narrative. Rather than seeking to observe which narrative has more 
explanatory power over the other, the paper understands each narrative, as well as the authors 
within them, as an important part of a theoretical mosaic that seeks to understand and explain a 
dubious, non-linear, diverse and full of setbacks and false starts process that is the formation of the 
modern state. Therefore, the paper delineates each one of the aforementioned narratives while 
shedding light on their fundamental arguments, authors and rationale. Finally, the paper provides a 
middle ground framework in regards to the state formation in Western Europe where the distinct 
narratives can meet and provide a more comprehensive understanding of the process in which the 
modern state was formed. 
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Resumo 
Este artigo examina um tema central, e um acirrado debate, dentro do campo da Ciência Política e 
das Relações Internacionais – a formação de estados modernos. O artigo delineia as principais 
narrativas que buscam explicar a formação do estado moderno na Europa Ocidental, 
nomeadamente: as narrativas econômica, gerencial e militar. Ao invés de buscar observar qual 
narrativa possui um maior poder explicativo relativamente às outras, entende-se que cada 
narrativa, bem como os autores dentro das mesmas, como uma parte importante de um mosaico 
teórico que busca entender e explicar o processo  dúbio, não-linear e diverso que é a formação do 
estado moderno. Desse modo, este artigo delineia cada uma das narrativas acima mencionadas 
destacando seus argumentos, autores e raciocínios fundamentais. Finalmente, o artigo apresenta 
uma moldura teórica intermediária relativamente ao processo de formação do estado na Europa 
Ocidental, onde as diferentes narrativas podem encontrar-se de modo a proverem um entendimento 
mais alargado a respeito do processo pelo qual o estado moderno formou-se. 
Keywords 
Formação do Estado; Estado Moderno; Europa Ocidental. 
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Introduction 
This paper deals with a still very pressing topic, and lively debate, within 
Political Science and International Relations – the formation of modern states. It 
presents, delineates, and most importantly, agglutinates the main narratives that 
seek to explain the formation of the modern state in Western Europe. Since 
fundamental practices and processes of current international scenario, namely 
state-building and peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict scenarios
1
, develop within 
the framework of, and seek to replicate, the outcomes of this process; it is of 
utmost importance to have a refined observation of the main narratives that seek 
to account such process. 
In an enterprise such as this, the concept of „state‟ certainly cannot be 
downplayed. Undoubtedly, the concept of „state‟ is central to most political 
analysis and, perhaps because of it, it is a concept widely deployed, very difficult 
to define, and heavily contested (HAY and LISTER, 2006). Due to the scope, 
objective and limit of this paper, herein it will not be developed a major 
understanding of the concept and the debates surrounding it
2
. Herein, it suffices to 
understand „state‟ as a political entity which, internally, has the monopoly of the 
legitimate law-making, and “its administrative staff successfully upholds the 
claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement 
of its order” (WEBER, [1922] 1978, p. 54). Additionally, it must possess key 
attributes formulated and agreed in the Montevideo Convention on Rights and 
Duties of States, which remains “the most widely accepted formulation of the 
principal criteria of statehood in international law” (CAPLAN, 2005, p. 52). These 
key attributes are: a permanent population, a defined territory, government, and 
the capacity to enter into relations with the other states (LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 
1936). 
Nowadays, to conceive a political entity named „state‟ taking part in the 
ordinary daily life is definitely not something extraordinary for many, if not most, 
of the people of the world. Nevertheless, this was not always the case. Indeed, as 
John Hall and John Ikenberry (1989) note it: “most of human history has not been 
graced by the presence of states” (HALL and IKENBERRY, 1989, p. 16). Though 
the term „state‟  
 
Has been used retrospectively to refer to mechanisms and processes of 
political governance arising in Mesopotamia as early as 3000 BC, it is 
only since the seventeenth century that human history has been graced 
by the concept of the state (HALL and IKENBERRY, 1989, p. 4-5).  
 
According to Colin Hay and Michael Lister (2006), most conventional 
accounts place the origins of the state “in the transition from the nomadic 
                                                 
1
 For more in this regards, see for instance (PARIS and SISK, 2009; RICHMOND and FRANKS, 
2009; RICHMOND, 2010). 
2
 For this, see for example (VINCENT, 1992; HAY, LISTER and MARSH, 2006). 
The Modern State in Western Europe | 171 
subsistence of hunter-gatherer to more agrarian societies characterized, 
increasingly, by organized agriculture” (HAY and LISTER, 2006, p. 5). 
Furthermore, the authors delineate three key aspects to the beginning of the 
development of the state as a political entity. Firstly, they argue that only due to 
the relative geographical immobility, consequence of the agricultural production, 
that it was possible to build institutions/infrastructure that enabled the governing 
and the projection of power. Secondly, they highlight religion. This factor was 
important to the consolidation of state power in the sense that it gave legitimacy to 
the organized and centralized use of coercive power, often through the appeal of 
divine authority, enhancing the institutional capacity to govern and to regulate. 
Thirdly, the ability to mobilize militarily was a high competitive advantage in 
relation to pre-state-like societies. Rapidly, conquest was a pivotal mechanism 
through which this institutional form of political organization was diffused (HAY 
and LISTER, 2006, p. 5). This consequently sparked a snow-ball effect either 
because conquered would have to adopt the political organization of the 
conqueror, or because other political organizations should reorganize themselves 
in order to check the political organization named „state‟. 
Nevertheless, as Hay and Lister (2006) correctly remember, “[i]f the 
origins of the state itself lie in the Mesopotamia, then it is to Western Europe that 
we must turn if we are to establish the origins of the modern state” (HAY and 
LISTER, 2006, p. 5). It is somewhat known Max Weber‟s statement that “[t]he 
state in the sense of the rational state has existed only in the Western world” 
(WEBER, [1923] 1961, p. 249). So, apart to the fact that the first state formation 
processes, in its wildest sense, can be traced far back more than four thousand 
years ago in ancient Near East and also China, it is the state formation processes 
in Western Europe that brings the modern understanding of state with a core 
bureaucratic infrastructure as its backbone (ERTMAN, 2005, p. 367). Hence, 
“[t]he state is not universal. It emerged in its modern form between the twelfth 
and eighteenth centuries in Western Europe” (POGGI, 2004, p. 95). As such, one 
can reasonably say that, for the political sociological literature, state formation “is 
usually understood to mean the process by which states are created and then 
establish and consolidate their monopoly of legitimate violence over a given 
territory by constructing a durable administrative, financial, judicial, and military 
apparatus” (ERTMAN, 2005, p. 367). Now, the question lies on how to make 
sense of this state formation process and its consolidation, and herein lays the 
fundamental purpose of this paper. 
 Analyzing key contributions to the state formation literature, Thomas 
Ertman (2005) argues that three major thinkers inspire whole generations of 
authors dedicated to this theme. They are: Karl Marx, Max Weber and Otto 
Hintze. Ertman goes further calling Weber and Hintze the “founding fathers” of 
state formation theory (ERTMAN, 2005, p. 327). It is clearly feasible to 
understand each one of these major authors as having a clear influence on each of 
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the main accounts on state formation herein delineated. Following Gianfranco 
Poggi (2004), they can be perfectly labeled, respectively, as: an economic, a 
managerial, and a military narrative. 
The point of the paper is certainly not to seek to investigate which 
narrative has more weight, or explanation power, than the others.  Moreover, the 
purpose is not also to delineate all possible narratives that seek to explain the state 
formation process, which could even be counterproductive. The main point here is 
to delineate the fundamental ones, understanding each narrative, as well as the 
authors within them, as an important part of a theoretical mosaic that seeks to 
understand and explain a dubious, non-linear, diverse and full of setbacks and 
false starts process that is the formation of the modern state. In this sense, this 
paper is divided in four parts. In each of the three initial parts, it will be presented 
the three possible narratives for the state formation in Western Europe, namely the 
economic, managerial and military narratives, while shedding light to the main 
actors, processes and practices of each one of them. These narratives, rather than 
isolated approaches, they should be viewed as reciprocally influential and 
interdependent narratives which, collectively, make a refined account of the state 
formation process in Western Europe. Finally, the paper presents an 
understanding about the state formation that can be fairly understood as a middle 
ground where different explanatory narratives in regards to the process can meet 
in order to account the state formation process in Western Europe. 
 
The Economic Narrative 
Following Marx, the economic narrative of state formation emphasizes the 
role played by the class struggle in the process of the formation and consolidation 
of the states (GOETZE and GUZINA, 2010). It focuses mainly at: where the 
production and distribution of wealth happens; how it is done; the political 
phenomena surrounding it; and the conflicts resulting from the formation and 
development of the state. Hence, it is concerned with the building asymmetry of 
wealth, and consequently, with the asymmetric allocation of the capacity to 
exercise coercion. As such, the state is seen “as an outcome of class struggle 
between producers and exploiters in a capitalist mode of production” (POGGI, 
2004, p. 102 and 95). 
According to Marx, exploitation, in a capitalist mode of production, does 
not need the use of force or direct violence. It comes in contractual relations 
between formally free individuals, once those who are exploited become greatly 
dispossessed of autonomous control over the means of production. This kind of 
economic organization requires certain rearrangements of political relations and 
juridical aspects to work properly (POGGI, 2004). They are: (1) “orderly, 
purposefully organized cooperation within units and secure exchange between 
units”; (2) “widening territorial reach of power centers”; (3) “two fundamental 
developments in the field of private law: the return to the absolute Roman 
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conception of property (dominium) and the establishment of contract as the key 
device for the creation and transmission of rights”; (4) “the contractualization of 
employer/employee relations allow[ing] capitalists to dismiss any responsibility 
for the workers‟ livelihood, to treat labor (power) as commodity”; and (5) “the 
emergence of a new kind of collective actor – class” (POGGI, 2004, p. 103). 
Hence, on the one hand, the private property allows those who own it a privileged 
position regarding the deployment of coercive powers, vested in the police and the 
judiciary. On the other hand, these rearrangements are essential requisites of the 
formation and advancement of the capitalist mode of production (Idem). 
Therefore, for this narrative there is a mutual reinforcement between the two 
dynamics. 
 Barrington Moore (1966), in his Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy, seeks “to explain the varied political roles played by the landed upper 
classes and the peasantry in the transformation from agrarian societies [...] to 
modern industrial ones” (MOORE, 1966, p. 8). It attempts to clarify a range “of 
historical conditions under which either or both of these rural groups have become 
important forces behind the emergence of Western parliamentary versions of 
democracy, and dictatorships of the right and the left, that is, fascist and 
communist regimes” (MOORE, 1966, p. 8). Moore looks to the internal class 
structure of states at the beginning of economic modernization correlating critical 
events, viewed as class struggles, to different political outcomes. As such, he 
correlates “bourgeois revolution” with Western parliamentary democracies; 
“revolution form above” with fascist dictatorship; and “peasant revolution” with 
Communist dictatorship” (SKOCPOL, 1973, p. 4-5). Hence, he delineates “three 
routes to the modern world” namely: democracy, fascism and communism. 
 His focus on class structures, its strategies and alliances on the process of 
state formation is very elucidative regarding the political development of the 
states. Ertman (2005) argues that although the European state formation was not 
the very core of the book, these elements are very helpful to understand, for 
example, the cross-class alliances between: (1) commercially oriented noble 
landlords and urban bourgeoisie, which took the royal absolutism from power in 
England; (2) bourgeois excluded from offices, disadvantaged workers and peasant 
which led to the French Revolution; and (3) between Prussian/German royal 
bureaucracy and the militarized aristocracy which maintaining a labor repressive 
agriculture made possible a revolution from above, which led to the fascism on 
the long run. Simultaneously, Ertman pinpoints the role of demands for taxes in 
the nurturing of these alliances (ERTMAN, 2005). Ertman (2005) also remembers 
Skocpol‟s critique who argues that is necessary to overcome the exclusive 
intrasocietal focus of the analysis incorporating a world-historic intersocietal 
perspective (SKOCPOL, 1973) to address the question of state formation. 
 This was precisely what Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) did in his The 
Modern World-System observing the role played by states in the emergence and 
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reproduction of the, in Wallerstein‟s words, „European world economy‟ 
(ERTMAN, 2005, p. 373). To Wallerstein (1974), it is evident that the rise of the 
absolute monarchy in Western Europe is timely coordinated with the emergence 
of a European world-economy. Furthermore, he argues that “the development of 
strong states in the core areas of the European world was an essential component 
of the development of modern capitalism” (WALLERSTEIN, 1974). He 
perceived a process of an increasing state power throughout the modern era, 
observing that the capitalist world-economy not only facilitated, but also required 
this process of increased centralization and internal control. This occurred through 
four major mechanisms: bureaucratization, monopolization of force, creation of 
legitimacy, and homogenization of the subject population (WALLERSTEIN, 
1974).  
 The bureaucratization is an important mechanism because it changes 
fundamentally the political arena in four aspects. First, it enhances the position of 
the king who now has a new group of permanent and dependent officials at his 
disposal. Second, the economic policy decisions could not easily bypass the state 
structure. Third, an efficient bureaucracy would be able to extract from the 
population and creditors (selling offices, taxing and borrowing more) a financial 
surplus greater than its maintenance costs. Forth, this increase in revenue allowed 
the states to enhance its capacity of coercive power and also to create standing 
armies (WALLERSTEIN, 1974). This connects to the second mechanism, 
monopolization of force. It was only due to this revenue that the state could pay 
mercenaries, whose recruitment “was geographically and socially skewed, part 
and parcel of the new European division of labor”. Hence, many of the 
mercenaries came from the “less-developed” parts of Western Europe 
(WALLERSTEIN, 1974, p. 139). These not only strengthened the monarch, but 
also employed the poor, generated revenues for entrepreneurs involved in parallel 
activities linked to the army, such as its recruitment or its feeding, and, mainly, 
provided the possibility of internal order (WALLERSTEIN, 1974).  
 Regarding the creation of legitimacy, Wallerstein (1974) argues that this 
was not directed to the base of social pyramid but to the top. To him, political 
stability rested in the ability of the small groups of state managers to convince 
other political actors, such as a larger group of state staff and regional leaders, 
“both that the regime was formed and functions on the basis of whatever 
consensual values these cadres can be made to believe exist and that it is in the 
interest of these cadres that this regime continue to function without major 
disturbance” (WALLERSTEIN, 1974, p. 144). To Wallerstein this was achieved 
through the propagation of the divine right of the kings (WALLERSTEIN, 1974). 
Finally, regarding the last mechanism, Wallerstein clearly correlates the degree to 
which the population could be transformed into a culturally homogeneous group 
and the indication of success of the process of centralizing power. Again, he does 
not see it as a mechanism mainly targeting the masses, rather “the king, his 
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bureaucracy and courtiers, the rural landowners (large and small), the merchants” 
(WALLERSTEIN, 1974, p. 147). In this sense, Wallerstein observes that “[i]n the 
sixteenth century, while core states are moving toward greater „ethnic‟ 
homogeneity among these strata, peripheral areas are moving precisely in the 
opposite direction” (WALLERSTEIN, 1974, p. 147). This was achieved through 
the expulsion and political weakening of minorities, and also the elimination of 
religious pluralism. 
 Clearly influenced by Marx, but also by Weber and Hintze (GOETZE and 
GUZINA, 2010), Perry Anderson also advances his understanding of the state 
formation process in Europe. In a directly articulated pair of books (ANDERSON, 
1974a), that ultimately develops a single argument (ANDERSON, 1974b), 
Anderson explores the diverse political outcomes of state development in Europe. 
He observes three different political outcomes: (1) a moderate absolutism in 
Western and Southern Europe (France and Spain); (2) a hard one in the East 
(Brandenburg-Prussia, Austria, Russia); and (3) few cases where it was removed 
by a bourgeois revolution (England and the Dutch Republic) (ERTMAN, 2005). 
This differentiation was a result of the uneven development of Europe; the hard 
economic and social crisis of the fourteenth century divided Europe. Anderson 
observes that the crisis affected different social classes in diverse forms in distinct 
states leading to disparate political outcomes. In the West, noble landlords were 
weakened while royal authority and the towns were strengthened. The exceptions 
were England and Holland where the bourgeoisie was strong enough to check the 
absolutist project. In the East, the towns and peasantry were weakened while the 
nobility was clearly strengthened (ERTMAN, 2005). Hence, Anderson exposes 
how the uneven development among European states led to different political 
outcomes. Apart from this, he also places greater weight to a variable, which will 
be developed later in this paper, than other‟s influenced by Marx – war and war‟s 
preparation – what evidences Hintze‟s influence on him (ERTMAN, 2005). 
 Still in the economic narrative but with a different tone, more influenced 
by the rational choice approach (ERTMAN, 2005), Douglass North and Robert 
Thomas (1973) also seek to explain the rise of Western Europe. Their argument is 
that the West rose due to the development of efficient economic organizations in 
Western Europe. This entails the “establishment of institutional arrangements and 
property rights that create an incentive to channel individual economic effort into 
activities that bring the private rate of return close to the social rate of return” 
(NORTH and THOMAS, 1973, p. 1). In this way, the individuals would be 
incentivized to perform activities that would bring better social returns. If property 
rights are ill-defined, the costs of an individual to perform an activity will be 
greater than its benefits and therefore such activity will not be performed, even 
though it is socially beneficial. Hence, for them, economic growth will take place 
if property rights are arranged in such a way that it lowers the individual costs 
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making it worthwhile to perform socially productive activities. (NORTH and 
THOMAS, 1973). 
 
The Managerial Narrative 
In regards to the managerial narrative, it is clear that Weber has a pivotal 
influence. Although Poggi (2004, p. 95) places Weber, with its emphasis on the 
state‟s monopoly of legitimate violence, as majorly influencing a military 
narrative of state formation, perhaps it makes more sense to place him as 
influencing the managerial narrative due to his mastery of one key pillars of 
modern states – the modern bureaucracy3. As Weber put it, “[p]atrimonial 
conditions have had an extraordinary impact as the basis of political structures” 
(WEBER, [1922] 1978, p. 1013). Hence, for this narrative, according to Ertman 
(2005) the state formation process “can be seen above all as a struggle between 
patrimonial rulers and their staffs over control of the „means of administration‟” 
(WEBER, [1922] 1978, p. 369). This is so because, as Weber clarifies it, “[t]he 
bureaucratic structure goes hand in hand with the concentration of the material 
means of management in the hands of the master” (WEBER, [1922] 1978, p. 980). 
Thomas Ertman (2005) proceeds observing that it was only at the eve of 
the French Revolution that the rulers in the West started to transform its 
patrimonial administration into modern bureaucracies. This happened trough: (1) 
the appropriation of offices by the ruler; (2) their filling with a new corps of 
university-educated people without any right to the office; and (3) their 
organization in a functional manner (ERTMAN, 2005). He sees that this 
transformation, for Weber, was “promoted by [the] needs arising from the creation 
of standing armies, determined by power politics, and from the related 
development of public finances” (WEBER, [1922] 1978, p. 972). This point, 
according to Ertman (2005), approximates Weber to an argument developed by 
the military narrative (which is highly influenced by Hintze) that sees in the 
geopolitical competition and threat of war across Europe the basic explanation for 
its state formation process. 
 Analyzing also a managerial narrative, Poggi (2004) focuses mainly on 
two works: Joseph Strayer‟s (1970) On the Medieval Origins of the Modern States 
and Harold Berman‟s (1983) Law and Revolution. Strayer (1970) observed a set 
of processes that developed in the period from 1100 to 1600, among them the 
emergence of political entities that endured in time and had a fixed space. He 
(Idem) observed “the development of permanent, impersonal institutions, 
agreement on the need for an authority which can give final judgments, and 
acceptance of the idea that this authority should receive the basic loyalty of its 
subjects”. Hence, he focuses on the development of practices and processes 
concerned with the effective modes of management and political administration of 
large territories advanced on behalf of rulers by bodies of professional 
                                                 
3
 See for example WEBER, (1978 [1922]). 
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administrators (POGGI, 2004). Strayer (1970) was thus concerned with “the 
evolving practices relating to the recruitment, training, and employment of those 
administrators, and with the distinctive practices which they develop […] and 
which later become to a certain extent traditional” (STRAYER, 1970). Finally, 
Strayer (1970) saw the development of the modern state as an ongoing dual 
process: (1) the development of many and more effective forms of collecting 
resources; and (2) the provision of services to the public. 
 Reflecting on Berman‟s contribution to the state formation debate, Poggi 
highlights Berman‟s attention to the role played by the ecclesiastics when he says 
that “the first state in the West was that which was established in the church by 
the papacy in the late eleventh and twelfth century” (BERMAN, 1983 apud 
POGGI, 2004, p.98). To Poggi (2004) this is because the Gregorian reformation 
expressed and sustained a legal discourse used to “institute, activate, and 
coordinate ecclesiastical organs – and such discourse was later much used, in 
properly political bodies, to orient and control binding decisions, including those 
involving the threat of or the recourse to violence” (POGGI, 2004, p. 98).  
Nevertheless, the major contribution of Berman is his argument regarding 
the key role played by law in the state formation process (POGGI, 2004). The law 
was important because of two reasons. Firstly, it allowed two dynamics: (1) it 
reduced eventualities in the conduct of public organisms and in the determination 
of the population‟s obligations in the sense that they were all tied to an expressed 
body of commands valid for everyone; and (2) each law, following certain lawful 
rules, could be suppressed or changed by another law. In this way, the 
administrative and juridical organisms could be programmed to operate in certain 
ways and this act of programming was variable. This facilitated, for example, the 
extension of the law to territories recently incorporated. Secondly, law was pivotal 
because it is a sophisticated, very intellectual product which not only could be 
developed and systematized, but also taught. This fact assisted the rulers and their 
top administrators to select and to train a very specialized personnel which 
through the beginning of the modern state formation would replace the feudal and 
clerical people in the political administration of the state (POGGI, 2004). 
 
The Military Narrative  
The military narrative is essentially concerned about the role of violence in 
the European state formation processes. It sees this process as the organization, 
and consequently institutionalization, of internal and external use of violence. The 
former relates to the suppression of threats to the internal public order through the 
police and law enforcement. The latter relates to the influence of war, and the 
preparation to it, to the process of state formation. Clearly, the latter is much more 
elaborated than the former by the state formation literature. From this narrative, 
the modern state was from the beginning shaped by war making and by the 
concern of establishing, maintaining and reinforcing a military capacity. 
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Furthermore, it was also very much influenced by the great revenues of war 
(POGGI, 2004), either stimulating the internal economy, or by the simple 
assimilation of fortunes. 
It can be perceived a major influence of Otto Hintze on the military 
narrative. To him, “all state constitution is originally war constitution, military 
constitution” (HINTZE, 1970 apud POGGI, 2004, p. 99). Observing the state 
formation processes in Europe, Hintze divided them in two categories: (1) the 
absolutist government with a bureaucratic administration on the continent; and (2) 
the parliamentary government with a non-bureaucratic administration carried out 
by nobles in England. Hintze argued that this difference was due to the war, or its 
threat, emanated from the neighboring forces. Hence, the geopolitical pressure 
routinely experienced by those in the continent, and less by England, was crucial 
to the state formation processes. This is because the more exposed to this pressure 
the rulers were, more they concentrated power in their hands and built 
professional bureaucracies to administer the standing armies and the whole 
infrastructure surrounding them such as equipment, payment and provisions 
(ERTMAN, 2005). 
A great contribution to this perspective, and the military narrative, is the 
book The Formation of National States in Western Europe edited by Charles Tilly 
(1975a). Tilly problematizes, general aspects but, in the very foreword of the 
book, Lucian Pye asserts that “[p]ossibly most striking and disturbing is the 
finding of the authors of this volume that wars and the threats of war played such 
a critical part in building the strong states of Europe” (TILLY, 1975a, p. XX). 
Yet, perhaps the greater contribution of Tilly was how he framed the question of 
state formation and the way he searched for the answer (ERTMAN, 2005). Instead 
of starting asking what happened, Tilly asked what could have happened in order 
to investigate the increasing dominance of state in Western Europe (TILLY, 
1975b). In order to investigate the state formation process, Tilly adopted a 
prospective attitude rather than a retrospective one. To him, to compare the 
Western European countries, like England, France, or Spain, for example, was to 
study the political organization victor of a hard competition among other kinds of 
political organizations; it was to frame the inquiry on a kind of outcome that in 
fact was quite rare (TILLY, 1975b). 
 For Tilly (1975b), in the thirteenth century, five possible political 
outcomes were possible: (1) the national state; (2) a political federation or empire 
with a single center; (3) a theocratic federation structured by the Church; (4) an 
intensive trading network; and (5) the persistence of the feudal structure present at 
the time (Ibidem: 26). The state differed from them in some significant forms: the 
control of a defined and continuous territory; its centralization; its differentiation 
from other organizations; and the reinforcement of its claims through the 
acquisition of the monopoly over the concentrated means of physical force within 
its territory (TILLY, 1975b). 
The Modern State in Western Europe | 179 
 It is seen though that “[m]ost of the European efforts to build states failed” 
(TILLY, 1975b, p. 38). Tilly delineates some aspects that influenced the state 
formation: (1) the availability of extractable resources; (2) a relatively protected 
position; (3) a continuous supply of political entrepreneurs; (4) success in war; (5) 
homogeneity/homogenization of the subject population; and (6) a strong coalition 
of the central power with key segments of the landed elite (TILLY, 1975b). The 
element that connected and aggregated all these aspects was war and the 
preparation to it. For him, clearly, the preparation for war was the key state 
formation activity (TILLY, 1975b). The process of constructing an effective 
military machine produced arrangements, processes and institutions that remained 
over time and could be used for other state purposes. This process “tended, 
indeed, to promote territorial consolidation, centralization, differentiation, of the 
instruments of government and monopolization of the means of coercion, all the 
fundamental state-making processes” (TILLY, 1975b, p. 42). This is from where 
comes Tilly‟s well-known quotation that “[w]ar made the state and the state made 
the war” ( TILLY, 1975b, p. 42). 
 Preparing to, or actually making, war is a very expensive enterprise. 
Therefore, it is not unusual that the military narrative pays a good attention to 
resources and its extraction as an important element to the state formation in 
Western Europe. Still acknowledging the key role of war and its preparation in 
state formation, the variations in the resource extraction also explain the 
differentiations within the state formation processes. Observing this element, Tilly 
refines Hintze‟s geopolitical argument. Tilly (1985) argued that the principal 
variations in European state formations resulted from: (1) the variations in the 
difficult of collecting taxes; (2) the expense of maintaining a certain kind of army; 
and (3) the amount of war needed to hold enemies.  
 Later in his work, Tilly (1990) observes the interplay between the 
concentration of capital and coercion to account for the variations in the state 
formation processes, delineating three paths. First, the coercion-intensive path, 
where “rulers squeezed the means of war from their own populations and others 
they conquered, building massive structures of extraction in the process”. Second, 
the capital-intensive path, where the “rulers relied on compacts with capitalists – 
whose interests they served with care – to rent or purchase military force, and 
thereby warred without building vast permanent state structures”. Finally, an 
intermediate path was the capitalized coercion mode, where the “rulers did some 
of each, but spent more of their effort than did their capital-intensive neighbors on 
incorporating capitalists and sources of capital directly into the structures of their 
states” (TILLY, 1990, p. 30). This latter path, according to Tilly, was the most 
“effective in war, and therefore provided a compelling model for states that had 
originated in other combinations of coercion and capital” (TILLY, 1990, p. 31). 
Still in this line of thought, Brian Downing (1992) conjugates the 
geopolitical view with the internal mobilization of resources to develop his 
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argument. Downing saw in the medieval Western Europe a whole set of 
institutions that counterbalanced the royal power – “the rule of law, a developed 
conception of rights, autonomous cities, decentralized military organization and 
above all representative institutions – institutional arrangements that Downing 
collectively terms medieval constitutionalism” (ERTMAN, 2005, p. 378). Ertman 
(2005) sees that while accounting the impact of changes in military technology, 
and its consequence in size and costs, in the state formation process, Downing‟s 
argument can be summarized as follows: where the war was so heavy and 
protracted that required a great domestic resource mobilization, that 
constitutionalism was broke and saw the emergence of a military-bureaucratic 
form of government. Where the war was light or its requirements could be 
developed without a great internal mobilization effort the constitutional kind of 
government prevailed. Finally, where warfare was protracted, military 
modernization and political centralization were prevented, and foreign resources 
were absent, the lost of sovereignty to stronger states was the fate (DOWNING, 
1992). 
 
A Possible Middle Ground on State Formation 
Observing the aforementioned narratives, it is clear that Francis Fukuyama 
(2011), in his The Origins of Political Order, perhaps best sums up the state 
formation discussion and offers what could be easily understood as a middle 
ground where different narratives on state formation can meet, while delineating a 
framework for the process. For him, war, and the threat of it, was a key element 
during the state formation process. Areas where this element was absent 
developed modern states relatively later than where the military competition was 
present. In order to engage in war, the state had to mobilize a large, and 
increasing, amount of resources. On the one hand, this increasing need for 
resources lead to a higher taxation and to an extension of the state‟s domain in 
other to tax more people and resources. On the other hand, the state had to collect 
better. Consequently, it was developed a process of more centralization, 
bureaucratization and rationalization (FUKUYAMA, 2011). 
The kind of state developed is, to Fukuyama, the result of the interaction 
among these states and the social groups within the society. The relationship of 
cooptation and resistance between the centralizing efforts and the social groups is 
essential to the variation of outcomes. The social groups delineated by Fukuyama 
(2011) are the upper nobility, the gentry and the Third Estate. The first group he 
describes as those who had their own land, army and resources. They also 
governed their own territory. The second group consisted of lesser elites (small 
landowners, knights, or other individuals), which had social status but did not 
necessarily have a significant amount of land and resources. The third one was 
composed by tradesmen, merchants, free serfs and those living in towns and cities. 
They were the incipient bourgeoisie. The peasantry, which was the vast majority 
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of the population, was not a significant political actor for Fukuyama since they 
rarely mobilized a collective action in order to represent their interests. 
Whereas the state sought to expand its domination, the social groups 
sought to protect and increase their privileges, in absolute and in relation to each 
other. It is the degree of resistance to the state‟s centralization efforts, which 
depended on both internal cohesion of the social groups and their ability to 
cooperate, that shaped the state formation outcome. In a few words, when the 
social groups were weak, badly organized or the state could co-opt them, 
absolutist governments emerged. Accountable governments emerged when the 
state was relatively weak, the social groups were well-organized, and the 
relationship between them was well-balanced (FUKUYAMA, 2011). 
Furthermore, to Fukuyama, a successful state would combine a stable 
balance of three important political institutions: the state itself, the rule of law, and 
an accountable government. According to Fukuyama, the state is understood as 
the centralized source of authority which had the monopoly of the legitimate use 
violence over a defined territory. Regarding the rule of law, he argues that, often, 
social rules were formalized as written laws which were used to organize how 
power was distributed regardless the person exercising power and the time. Those 
written laws, with time, were gaining supreme authority over the whole society 
and the rulers who temporally headed the military and the bureaucracy. It was at 
that point, for him, that institutions superseded individual leaders. Moreover, 
certain societies also made their states accountable through the formation of 
parliaments, assemblies and bodies of representation of the population. Hence, 
one the one hand, the state concentrated the power, made the citizens compliant 
with the laws, and defended itself and its population from outside threats. On the 
other hand, the rule of law and accountable government limited state‟s power, 
making it operate within certain rules, and ensure that the state would be 
subordinates to the will of the population (FUKUYAMA, 2011). Hence, one can 
certainly understand the formation of the modern state in Western Europe as a 
majorly internally-driven process where the interplay of pivotal social actors 
would shape the characteristics of the resulting political entity. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper sheds light on the process of the formation of modern states in 
Western Europe. Throughout the paper, three main explanatory narratives of the 
process, namely the economic, a managerial, and a military narrative are analyzed. 
As delineated above, each of these narratives has a major thinker having a 
decisive influence on the possible explanations for the emergence of the modern 
state. They are respectively, Karl Marx, Max Weber and Otto Hintze. In regards to 
the process per se, taking into all account these studies, it is safe to argue that the 
state formation process was developed, mainly, through internal processes, rather 
than international ones. Certainly there were international influences to the 
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process. War, or the threat of it, for instance, was a key one. It was the threat of 
war, or the necessity of engaging on it, that created the need for resources. This 
led not only to a centralization of power and means of violence, but also to a 
fierce bureaucratization and consequently its rationalization. Therefore, it is quite 
reasonably to understand the state formation process as being the result of the 
relationship among different domestic political actors. For instance, whereas the 
Church was key to the development of a bureaucratic organization, and to the 
formation of an institutionalized and independent legal order, it was how this 
centralized bureaucratic organization interacted with key players of the social 
body that constituted the important element for defining the characteristics of the 
resulting state. In order to reach such understanding, one should perceive each one 
of the narratives herein delineated not as the explanatory narrative of the state 
formation process, but as an important part of a more comprehensive approach to 
understanding the complexities of the formation of the modern state in Western 
Europe. 
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